ReferenceFactors · v1.0
Active3 GA · 1 in beta

A few factors. One answer.

Each factor proves a different kind of presence. You pick one combination per provider to fit the risk you're defending against; whatever it is, your backend still gets just one thing back: yes or no.

§ 01 · The factors

Built to combine.

Three are generally available today; liveness is in beta. New factors slot in without re-issuing anyone's credentials, so you can raise assurance later without a migration.

K
F · 01

FIDO2 / Passkey

"What this device can sign for."

What it proves

Possession of a private key bound to a hardware-backed credential. Phishing-resistant by construction; the browser refuses to sign for a domain that isn't asking.

How it works

Standard WebAuthn / FIDO2 ceremony. AuthenSee derives a commitment from the assertion and feeds it into the proof circuit instead of speaking the assertion directly to the verifier.

When to use

Always. This is the workhorse factor: supported on every modern device, and the strongest thing we can ask of the OS.

Defends PhisherCred stufferMITMProfile linker
M
F · 02

Memory factor

"What this person remembers."

What it proves

Recognition of a private symbol set the user enrolled with. Resistant to synthesis: a generative model has no signal for an idiosyncratic memory tile.

How it works

The user enrolls a small set of symbols; at auth time, those are presented mixed with decoys and the user picks. The pick is committed to and proven correct; the symbols themselves never leave the device.

When to use

Anywhere a deepfake is in the threat model: sign-up, account recovery, high-stakes actions. Cheap to add, and the only factor in our stack that resists synthetic media outright.

Defends DeepfakeSybil farmCred stufferMITM
B
F · 03

Motion factor

"How this person's hand moves."

What it proves

A short device-motion gesture matches the way the enrolled person physically moves their phone. Behavioral, hard to observe over someone's shoulder, and nothing like a password to steal.

How it works

The user performs a small gesture; the accelerometer trace is matched on-device against an enrolled template, and only a pass/fail enters the proof. The raw motion never leaves the phone. On desktop it runs as a quick handoff to the user's phone.

When to use

Step-up and higher-assurance sign-in where you want a second, un-phishable factor that needs no camera and nothing for the user to remember.

Defends Cred stufferBot replaySybil farm
L
F · 04

On-device liveness

"That a live human is here, right now."

What it proves

A passive presence check passed an on-device classifier: a real, live person is present, not a recording or a script. Establishes "human is here right now" without a face on file.

How it works

A lightweight on-device model evaluates the challenge locally and emits only a pass bit; camera frames and any template never leave the device or get persisted. Verified and attested by AuthenSee, so every provider can trust it without running its own vendor.

When to use

Sybil-resistant sign-ups and "is this a human" gates. In beta now; not yet recommended as a sole assurance factor.

Defends Sybil farmBot replayDeepfake
§ 02 · The combinations

Picked the wrong combo? No re-onboard.

You set one factor combination per provider. Here are the shapes we see most; changing yours later is a config change, and your users add the new factor without starting over.

R · 01

Returning user signin

Fast, frictionless, phishing-resistant. The passkey-only default for everything that isn't a money or admin action.

KPasskey → verified
R · 02

Account creation (anti-sybil)

Higher cost per fake account without making real signup painful. Memory is cheap to enroll once and pays back forever.

KPasskey + MMemory → verified
R · 03

High-assurance step-up

Banking transfers, password resets, treasury moves. Add the motion factor for a second, un-phishable signal at the moment of risk.

KPasskey + BMotion → verified
R · 04

Autonomous agents

An AI agent mints its own keypair and enrolls directly, no human ceremony. The same identity primitive, discoverable via llms.txt.

AAgent key → verified
§ 03 · On the bench
✦ Public beta · April 2026

Pick your factors. Ship your flow.

Every generally-available factor here ships today. Talk to us and you're a few lines from a working sign-in.

Talk to us → Read the docs